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The reflection on intersubjectivity is a central question in the contemporary 
philosophical debate. In this field, current practical philosophy faces one of the 
most difficult challenges. Apparently, the research for a foundation of the 
intersubjective level seems to lead inevitably towards the abandonment of the 
logical-foundation theory on which the philosophy had been based up until 
Hegel. Thus, for example, there are those who have observed that it is possible 
to approach the subject of intersubjectivity only if beginning from “an  
understanding of the society in terms of communication, in other words, in 
terms of dialogue relations” [Cortella 1995, 200]. If that were so, the need 
would arise to attribute every social theory to a consideration of language, 
developing in this way an intersubjective constitution founded on mechanisms 
that are dialogic-communicative rather than logical-rational. In fact, this is the 
approach taken by the mojority of post-Hegelian practical continental 
philosophy.  In this report, however, I would like to attempt something 
different. That is, I would like to explore the possibility of  inserting the subject 
of intersubjectivity right into the heart of  Hegelian thinking, with an aim to 
outline the foundation of a social action theory capable of exhibiting reasons 
stronger than those deriving from simple dialogic validation.  
I am convinced that it is essential to avoid understanding 
intersubjectivity as something irreflexive; this is a risk, as V. Ho sle writes, 
contained between the folds of the “dialogic” positions. Even the 
intersubjective level must, like every other level of reflection, find good logical-
rational coverage. This is the great gamble of German idealism, and of Hegel in 
particular. The problem arises from the fact that, to quote Ho sle again, “real 
Hegelian philosophy is not completely covered by logic” [Ho sle 2012, 790], so 
that, if , in a Hegelian fashion, the primacy of logic is assumed, we find 
ourselves faced with an open task that is, in some way, requested by the deep 
spirit of Hegelian thinking – that is to say: the foundation of intersubjectivity – 
without, however, having the tools to resolve it. This, in my opinion, is a 
practical reflection which intends to proceed with Hegel beyond Hegel. Now, 
the difficult correspondence between the ideal level and the real level is the 
starting point from which the problem of the relationship between 
intersubjectivity and logic emerges. Reflection on intersubjectivity, in fact, is 
dominated by the in-depth anlaysis of the dynamics of recognition (die 





Anerkennung), which evidently require the subject of intersubjectivity be 
taken into consideration. Reflection on logic, however, would seem to be 
mainly pivot on the idea of the “solitary” self-development of the absolute. 
But is such a distance real? It may be useful to remember how, for 
Hegel, the Absolute, as a subject, is always structured according to a Beziehung 
in which a Verdopplung takes place, capable of placing it in Beziehung auf sich 
selbst so as to be able to be found as das Andere seiner selbst an ihm selbst. 
This means that for Hegel reflection is never really anything different 
with respect to the communication-relationship. That space which, in 
traditional logic, separates the subject and predicate in the judgement, 
appears, in Hegelian logic, put into motion and rethought. M. Theunissen 
writes: “verschwindet vorab das traditionell verstandene Subjekt, das 
hypokeimenon, jedoch so, dass es durch eine anders verstandene Subjektivität 
substituiert wird, die nun beide Seiten besetzt, auch die des ehemaligen 
Prädikats” [Theunissen 1994, 458]. Such a subject is a subject which is tightly 
bound to the idea of Bewegung, of motion. It implies the rethinking of the 
function – care must be taken: which is purely logical – of the copula, which is 
not lmited to uniting the terms of the judgement, but to indicating a task which 
the subject and predicate must carry out, whence the idea of motion. In this 
sense, the assumption of the predicate in the subject, far from implying the 
simple identification of both, rather indicates a deformity which Hegel 
transforms into a sort of dialectical engine. However, if we do not want such a 
dialectic to remain purely inside the subject, so that the Verdopplung which 
takes place in the subject is genuinely real, it is necessary to talk about a 
subject which has the abilty to come out of itself to then recover. This, very 
briefly, is the dialectical motion which Hegel discusses regarding judgement. 
This, at the same time, is the only way that the development of the subject 
does not end up presenting itself as being “solitary”. The space of actual 
otherness which is required as the subject can really find himself again opens 
up, perhaps, the area of thinkability of an authentic other-than-self which 
could be a basis for the topic of intersubjectiviy.  
It is possible to follow this common thread in the Hegelian treatise of 
the nature of the subject, since Hegel names such a subject Geist. The treatise 
of the topic of the eventual foundation space of intersubjectivity is, therefore, 
transformed into a discussion on the  nature of the Hegelian Geist. First of all, it 
must be said that, as far as the logical structure of  judgement is concerned, the 
Geist’s action is present not as much in the subject, as in the copula 
[Theunissen 1994, 456]:  in the latter, in fact, the logical translation of the 
constitutive activity of the Absolute itself is expressed. From this point of view, 
contrary to what is maintained by J. Habermas and A. Honneth, it is possible to 
maintain that in the Urteilslehre contained in the Wissenschaft der Logik from 
1816 that idea of opening to the Jena philosophy of the spirit is still present. In 





and predicate in the judgement is revealed as a recognition dynamics, the 
intersubjective form of transformation of  the immediate future, since, as it 
finally emerged in the doctrine of the Syllogism, the copula shows, in its logical 
universality, that which, on a practical level, it is possible to interpret as the 
continuation of the individual in other individuals. The same occurs also in the 
young Hegel’s philosophy of the Spirit, whose characterization in an 
intersubjective sense was made well known by J. Habermas and A. Honneth. 
The latter, in particular, is very clear in stating that the distance between the 
young Hegel and the mature Hegel consists in the different comprehension of 
Geist [Honneth 2002, 40]. On one hand, there would be the Geist  understood 
as a path of development of the power of the self in the System der Sittlichkeit 
of 1802; on the other, starting from at least the  Phänomenologie des Geistes, 
the Geist as a means of social constitution, of resolution of otherness of the 
two types of self-consciousness concerned Intersubjectivity, safeguarded in 
the first case as a place of comfort and the interlocution of two reciprocally 
irreducible subjects, in the second case would be scarificed according to the 
edification of an institutionalized community. The institutional dimension is, 
according to Honneth, the place of oblivion and distortion of the 
intersubjective dynamics: precisley in this place, the Geist, whose activities are 
capable of  weakening and overruling the Verdopplung, would rise. In saying 
this, Honneth renounces exhibiting  the logical translation of  such a Geist, 
since, as it has briefly been said, in writings in youth as well as in maturity the 
clearest logical transposition  of the activity in the Geist occurs in the case of 
the judgement, where such activity is never associated with the subsumption 
of the predicate in the subject – what implies Honneth’s criticism of the 
community- but with the reconciliation of the copula which does not suppress 
the distinction. Not by chance, Honneth chooses to bluntly expunge the logic of 
his debate, attributing the growing importance which Hegel gave to the 
problem of logical foundation of the sytem as the main cause of the failure of 
his initial project. Nevertheless, inserting intersubjectivity into the fulcrum of 
the Hegelian system, rather than confining it to the phase in which Hegel’s 
thinking still appears to be immature, in my opinion is an undeniable 
requirement, also because it has the quality of taking seriously the 
ontologically relational dimension of the Hegelian Absolute. 
Let us return to reflecting upon the Geist.  Differently from Theunissen, 
Honneth and Ho sle agreee in affirming the Geist’s insufficiency  in the face of 
the necessity to structure the Ich-Du relationship: the latter, to be real, 
requires in the first place an exit from the setting of the Geist as self-mediation 
carried out by the subject. Such an exit, if for Honneth is configured as taking 
leave from the logical fundamentals of Hegelism and reflection on the socio-
political dynamics of recognition, for Ho sle  leads to the theorization of  the 
Liebe dimension, present above all in the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Religion, in the specific form of the God-man relationship present in 





Christianity, the unique authentic subject-subject relationship discussed by 
Hegel. In my opinion, it is possible to reiterate the importance of Liebe in 
Hegel, observing how the implicit plurality of subjects in the loving dynamics 
is already present  between the folds of logic [see: McTaggart, McTaggart 
1910]. The logos for Hegel, in fact, is that which is not only capable of creating 
relationships, but which can continuously  breed new and free determinations 
[Houlgate 2006]. Just like the Geist, the logos itself is a collective endeavour. 
From here is the transition to what R. Pippin defines as theroy of social action 
as a practical translation of the logical achievement of the relationship [see: 
Pippin 2008]. Beginning with the treatise of inner (das Inneres) and outer (das 
Äußeres) in the Phänomenologie des Geistes (see: Pippin 2008, 150) he 
observes how the action, for Hegel, does not belong to the agent, since it 
implies the transition to a social dimension that is, of the exteriority, which, 
alone, makes it recognizable and readable as deed. The act’s exit from itself is 
however duplicate: on one hand, in fact, it shows the indissolubility of the 
connection between action and fact. On the other hand, it shows how «the deed 
is essentially out there for others». 
The action is configured as an opening to intersubjectivity. In other 
words, my freedom, in order to be actual, needs the freedom of others. This 
means that the recognition (Anerkennung) takes place on two levels. Firstly, 
the practice of my freedom passes through the experience of the freedom of 
others which, once recognized, it alone, can, in turn, recognize  me as being 
free.  
In the Phänomenologie, we first experience freedom in an attempt to 
subjugate the other – freedom as domain – which is followed by conflict (der 
Kampf um Anerkennung) and then relation. Of the latter there are two possible 
readings. The first, which has more than all helped to discredit Hegel with our 
contemporaries, is what might be called romantic, according to which the 
finite is called to become infinite. The second, which I am trying to explain 
here, according to which the finite is instead likely to remain as such in the 
intersubjective relationship in which the Absolute itself is. 
The Absolute, as Geist, is therefore to be made an object of recognition 
in the moment in which it reveals itself to be a relational tie of a social nature. 
The social structures through which human relationships are formed are 
transformed into something more than the form of the objective spirit, on 
which Honneth’s criticism is concentrated, and they become a place for 
intersubjective meeting. The two aspects, in reality, are tightly tied to each 
other. Geist and Liebe are, in some measure, difficult to separate.  
Feedom coincides with the ever sprouting life of the Spirit, and thus it 
is realized  in a constant Befreiung which is nothing other than the act of 
thinking the Necessity with which Hegel, in The Encyclopedia of the 





the Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept. This act consists of the 
reconjunction of One with Oneself in the Other. 
This transition, which Hegel himself described as the most arduous, is 
of capital importance. Hegel, although speaking about “contingency of 
sentiment”  (Zufälligkeit der Empfindung), explains also how the same 
liberation “considered as sentiment, is love” (als Empfindung Liebe). Love is 
the modality through which one can experience the fact that “die 
selbstständige Wirklichkeit gedacht werden soll, als in dem Übergehen und der 
Identität mit der ihr andern selbstständigen Wirklichkeit, allein ihre 
Substantialität zu haben” (Hegel 1989, §159). For this reason to truly love is 
difficult, because the difficulty of love reflects the notional difficulty in which 
one chances upon the thought when one intends to understand the truth of the 
intertwining movement of the spirit so that , therefore, even the Concept is the 
most arduous and difficult thing because it is exactly this identity.  
At this point it is evident how the relationship between Liebe and Geist 
reveals the deeepest of cross-references, to the point that one could say that 
love is the emotional-sentimental translation of that circle between essences 
which the concept reveals on a purely logical level and which, in the Geist, is 
expressed as an ability of supreme gift-of-oneself. 
For this reason, in the above mentioned transition from the Essence to 
the Concept in the Science of Logic, Hegel writes that the concept is the realm 
of subjectivity or of freedom [Hegel 2011, 646]. The underlining of the very 
close relationship between Begriff – Freiheit – Geist – Liebe could not be 
clearer1.  
The Spirit, just like love, «gewinnt seine Wahrheit nur, indem er in der 
absoluten Zerrisenheit sich selbst findet» [see: Hegel 1986], and it is much 
greater «aus je grösserem Gegensatze er in sich zurückkehrt» [Hegel 1986, 189].  
Social action thus becomes the place of affirmation of the third party  
(the Spirit) which works in the relationship between the two, but since the 
only tie which it creates is a tie of love, its effectiveness is not expressed in self-
affirmation, but in the willingness to renounce onself,  to come out of oneself 
which each of the two subjects is called to do in the moment in which they are 
on the point of recognizing the free – and therefore personal and subjective – 
nature of the other-than-self. 
                                                             
1 Franco Chiereghin writes: “In love, in fact, the entirety of my feeling and of my desire 
permeates itself with the feeling and desire of the other and, likewise, every thought 
and desire of the other penetrates me entirely, so that everyone finds another of 
himself in the other. This does not mean that everyone’s own individuality sinks into 
an undifferentiated identity, on the contrary: love, in its authenticity, cannot not love in 
the other  the most precious thing that he has, his freedom. That which every person 
loves and guards in the other is therefore his freedom and in the freedom of the other 
he finds his own freedom which is loved and guarded in the same way. For this reason, 
freedom, since it is encountering oneself in the other, is, in the sentiment, love” 
[Chiereghin 2011, 99]. 





The most profound reality of the Spirit eminently expresses this 
dynamic in Hegel: the Spirirt is He who conquers his own truth, only provided 
that he passes through absolute disintegration. The Spirit, therefore, can live 
only by dying. In the dialectic of recognition, the subject is therefore called to 
experience death. The death of a subject is not however to be understood in 
the form of pure self-destruction: it is, rather, the event which opens up the 
space to the recognition of the other. If, therefore, it is true that it is the Spirit – 
that is, the Absolute Subject – who presides over the entire process, acting as a 
third mediator, it is also true that the recognition consists of the opening 
which the first subject directs to a second subject. 
From here comes the intersubjective foundation of social action which, 
in my opinion, does not only not limit the I-you relationship to the internal 
dialectic of the Absolute Subject, but it actually elevates it to a place of 
consecration of single selfhoods – which in themselves end up being 
reciprocally recognized as such – as well as of the irreducibilty of these with 
regards to the Spirit itself. The mediation action of the latter, in fact, hangs 
onto, so to speak, the two subjects’ free acknowlegement of the renouncement 
which opens the space of recognition. 
Such recognition, after all, amounts to the possibility of the community 
dimension, which reallocates the subjects, which passed the acid test of the 
voluntary renouncement of oneself, within a future development in which the 
two relations finally appear transfigured by the actions of the third party. 
It is therefore possible, as Ho sle believed, that Hegel himself did not 
take this aspect of the profound dynamics of his thought too seriously, and that 
he had not prepared the notional categories to be able to think about it in 
depth. Nevertheless, the theoretical foundations of  intersubjectivity, brought 
back to its Hegelian roots, is the fundamental cornerstone upon which to build 
the logical-rational foundations of social action.  
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